Salim Lamrani
Introduction
For half a century, Washington's foreign policy towards Havana, whose objective is to achieve regime change, is based on two pillars: the imposition of economic sanctions drastic - which affect all parts of Cuban society, and the organization and financing of internal opposition.
Thus, April 6, 1960, Lester D. Mallory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, recalled in a memorandum to Roy R. Rubottom Jr., then Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs for the purpose of economic sanctions:
"The majority of Cubans support Castro. There is no effective political opposition [...]. The only possible way to destroy domestic support [the plan] is causing disenchantment and discouragement by economic dissatisfaction and lack [...]. All possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba [...]. A measure that could have a very strong impact would be to deny all funding and delivery to Cuba, which would reduce the cash income and real wages and cause hunger, desperation and overthrow of government 1.
From 1959 to 1990, the program of creating an internal division was kept secret. Thus, partially declassified U.S. records show multiple programs to create opposition to the government of Fidel Castro, which would serve the interests of the United States who wanted a regime change. From 1991, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the financial and logistical support to Cuban dissidents became public and was enshrined in U.S. legislation.
funding internal opposition
At a meeting of the National Security Council held January 14, 1960, Undersecretary Livingston Merchant stated: "Our goal is to adjust our actions to accelerate the development of an opposition in Cuba ". For its part, the Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Roy Rubottom asserted that "the program adopted [to overthrow the Cuban government] has allowed us to provide help to those who oppose the Castro government in Cuba, to believe that his fall was the result of his own mistakes 2 ".
In 1991, convinced that the final hour of the Cuban Revolution had arrived, the United States has not hesitated to publicly affirm their support for internal opposition. Section 1705 of the Torricelli Act of 1992 stipulates that "the U.S. will provide assistance to nongovernmental organizations suitable for supporting individuals and organizations that promote nonviolent democratic change in Cuba 3 ".
Section 109 of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996 refers to the same reality: "President [U.S.] is authorized to provide assistance and offer any kind of support to individuals and organizations independent non-governmental support for efforts to build democracy in Cuba 4 ".
The first report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba provides for the establishment of a "solid support program promoting Cuban civil society ". Among the recommended actions, funding totaling $ 36 million is intended to "support the democratic opposition and the strengthening of civil society emerging 5 " .
March 3, 2005, Roger Noriega, then assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Bush administration, reported that 14.4 million had been added to the budget of $ 36 million in planned the 2004 report. Noriega unveiled the identity of certain persons working on the development of U.S. foreign policy against Cuba, including Marta Beatriz Roque, the Damas de Blanco and Oswaldo Payá 6.
The second report of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba provides a budget of $ 31 million to fund more internal opposition. In addition, funding of at least 20 million dollars a year is allocated to the same effect for the following years "until the dictatorship ceases to exist 7. The plan also "train and equip independent journalists of print media, radio and television in Cuba 8.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), dependent on the federal government agrees to finance the Cuban opposition. According to the Agency for fiscal year 2009, the amount of aid to Cuban dissidents stood at 15.62 million dollars. "The vast majority of this money is intended for persons in Cuba. Our goal is to maximize the amount of support enjoyed by Cubans on the island 9 ".
The government organization also stresses the following point: "We've trained hundreds of journalists over a period of ten years whose work has appeared in major international media" . This statement undermines claims about the independent nature of "journalists opponents' Cuba. Having been trained and the pay of the United States, they respond to Washington's interests, whose aim is, as reported in official documents of the State Department, " a "regime change" in the island 10.
From a legal standpoint, this place is really the dissidents who accept the fees offered by USAID in the situation of workers employed by a foreign power, which constitutes a serious violation of the code criminal in Cuba as in any other country in the world. The Agency is aware of this reality also points out that "No one is obliged to accept or take part in government programs of the United States 11 " .
Section of North American interests in Havana, confirms this fact in a statement: "has long been U.S. policy is to provide humanitarian assistance to the Cuban people, especially families of political prisoners 12 ".
Laura Pollán splinter group "Ladies in White" openly claims that funding: "We accept help, support, whether from the extreme right or left, without conditions 13 ". The opponent Vladimiro Roca also confessed that Cuban dissidents were in the pay of Washington, but said that financial assistance was received "totally and completely legal" . For the dissident René Gómez, financial support from the United States is "not something we should hide or be ashamed that should 14 " . Similarly, the opponent Elizardo Sanchez has confirmed a grant from the U.S.: "The question is not who sends aid, but what we fact 15 ". For his part, Marta Beatriz Roque said that the financial assistance received from the U.S. government is essential for its activity disidente 16.
The Agence France-Presse reports that "dissidents, for their part claimed and assumed these grants 17 " . The English agency EFE alluded to "opponents paid by the United States 18 " . According to the British news agency Reuters , "the U.S. government provides openly federal financial support for the activities of dissidents, which Cuba considers an illegal 19 ".
The U.S. news agency The Associated Press expressed this reality and acknowledged that the policy making and finance internal opposition was not new: "For years, the U.S. Government United has spent millions of dollars to support Cuban opposition 20 ". She also spoke of the lifestyle of dissidents that benefit both emoluments Washington and the Cuban social system:
"Part of the funding comes directly from the government of the United States, whose laws call for the overthrow of the Cuban government. The Agency for International Development United States (USAID), which oversees the government's financial support for a 'democratic transition' in Cuba, has allocated more than $ 33 million for Cuban civil society for the current fiscal year.
Almost all Cubans, including dissidents, have free housing, access to health and education to university for free. Rations of rice, potatoes, soap and other basic products enable people to satisfy their basic needs for almost the entire month 21. "
The French daily Liberation note that the opponent Guillermo " Fariñas has never denied receiving 'donations' of the U.S. Interests Section to get a computer and exercise his profession 'freelance' Internet 22 ".
Amnesty International recognizes that the people she regards as political prisoners were sentenced "for having received money or materials from the U.S. government for activities perceived as subversive by the authorities or by harm to Cuba 23 ".
Wayne S. Smith, the last U.S. ambassador to Cuba, confirmed the subversive nature of U.S. policy. He said he is "illegal and unwise to send money to Cuban dissidents 24 ". He added that "nobody should give money to dissidents and even less in order to overthrow the Cuban government" because "when the United States say their goal is to overthrow the Cuban government, and that 'Then they say that one way to do this is to provide funds to Cuban dissidents, they are placed in the position of de facto officers paid by a foreign power to overthrow their own government 25 " .
A division
cut any popular base by Washington
Despite the political, economic, media and financial resources made available to the Cuban opposition, it has always been cut off from any popular base. Moreover, it is deeply divided and somewhat older. It is the bitter fact prepared by Jonathan D. Farrar, current head of the USIS in Havana, in a confidential memorandum of April 15, 2009 entitled "The United States and the role of opposition in Cuba" , and sent to the State Department 26.
The diplomat noted that the first Cuban President Raul Castro is currently in "a position of authority not questioned" . As to the role of dissent, it is "void" because "opposition groups are dominated by individuals with strong egos who do not work together" . Farrar said that "the dissident movement in Cuba is aging and completely disconnected from the everyday ordinary Cubans" . Indeed, because of fees charged, Cuban dissidents led a lifestyle that no average citizen the island can not afford 27.
Farrar admits he is in regular contact "with most of the dissident movement official in Havana" , whose members frequently travel to the USIS . He notes however that "there is no evidence to show that the dominant dissident organizations in Cuba have an influence on how the Cubans. Informal polls conducted among visa applicants and asylum showed virtually no knowledge of dissident figures or their agenda 28 ".
Farrar says that by the age of opponents, most of whom are between 50 and 70 years and cites Francisco Chaviano, Rene Gomez Manzano and Oswaldo Payá. "They have very little contact with the Cuban youth, and their message of no interest to this segment of society" . The diplomat regretted the infighting among various groups and lack of unity. His trial is relentless: "Despite claims that they represent" thousands of Cubans, 'we have no evidence of such support, at least in terms of Havana where we are " . He adds that "they have no influence in Cuban society and do not offer a political alternative to the government of Cuba 29 " .
This opinion is shared by other European diplomats, who spoke at a meeting with Farrar. "Representatives of the European Union at the meeting dissidents disqualified under the same terms as the Government of Cuba, insisting they" do not represent anyone 30 '".
There is a reason and it is in the idiosyncrasies of Cuba. Cuban society is certainly far from being monolithic and sectors of the population are unhappy in their severe criticism of the authorities when it comes to expose the contradictions, aberrations, bigotry and injustice sometimes generated by the Cuban system. The criticisms are sometimes harsh and uncompromising, and are relayed by the Cuban media as Farrar. USIS notes that "many newspaper articles are very critical of current policies 31 ". Nevertheless, despite all the vicissitudes of daily living, the Cubans are viscerally attached to their independence and national sovereignty and can not conceive that their compatriots would accept to serve a foreign power that has always wanted to repossess Island. This is the political legacy "anti-imperialist" left by the great men of the nation's history such as José Martí, Antonio Maceo, Máximo Gómez, Julio Antonio Mella, Antonio Guiteras, Chiba and Eduardo Castro .
U.S. diplomacy also mentioned another reason: the persistent popularity of Fidel Castro Cubans from fifty years after coming to power. "It would be a mistake to underestimate [...] the support available to the government especially popular with communities and students 32 " . Farrar said the "significant personal admiration for Fidel" within Cuban society 33.
The SINA also criticizes the lack of program and the greed of opponents, only interested by revenues that trade can make the division: "Their biggest effort is to obtain enough resources for the main organizers and supporters to live properly. A political organization has openly and frankly said that she needed money to pay salaries, and presented a budget in the hope that the USIS supports spending. In addition to research funding that is their main concern seems to be their second priority criticize or marginalize the activities of their competitors, to preserve their power and access to resources 34 "
Nevertheless, Farrar emphasizes again the importance of opposition in the U.S. and objectives for this "we need the support" while seeking an alternative to reinvigorate the dissident movement in Cuba 35.
Priority Sánchez
U.S. diplomacy sees the blogger Sánchez a credible alternative to the traditional division and placed its hopes in it, which explains his international reputation while being a perfect unknown in Cuba. " We believe that the younger generation of dissidents nontraditional, such as Sánchez may play a role in the long term in a post-Castro Cuba ". Farrar and advises the State Department to focus its efforts on the breakaway and bring him more support 36.
Indeed, the term atypical Sánchez raises some questions. Having emigrated to Switzerland in 2002, she chose to return to Cuba two years later, in 2004. In 2007, she decided to join the world of the opposition in Cuba, creating a blog Generación Y and became a fierce critic of the government in Havana 37.
His criticisms are harsh and not very nuanced. It presents an overview of apocalyptic reality Cuban authorities accuse of being responsible for all ills. She says Cuba is "a huge prison, with walls ideological 38 " a "boat taking in water from all sides and is about to be wrecked 39 " where "be the shadows, like vampires who feed on our human joy, we inoculate the fear through beatings, threats, blackmail 40 ". Sánchez's blog described the Cuban reality so terrible and no positive feature is not apparent. Similarly, she carefully avoids the geopolitical context in which there is singular Cuba since 1959.
Sánchez holds a specific discourse that often approximates the U.S. position. Thus, it minimizes the impact of economic sanctions - "an excuse" for the Cuban government - claiming that "the Cuban government is responsible for 80% of the economic crisis current and 20% is due economic sanctions 41 ". The international community, far from sharing this opinion, condemned (187 countries cons both) the economic siege in 2010 for the for the 19 th consecutive time, considering the main obstacle to the development of the island . She justifies this by nationalizations occurred in the 1960s and because of the missile crisis 42. She says "the embargo has made the perfect argument for the Cuban government to maintain intolerance, control and internal repression. If tomorrow we lifted the sanctions, I doubt whether one sees the effects 43.
Regarding the case of five Cuban agents convicted in 1998 and sentenced to life imprisonment in the U.S. for having infiltrated small groups responsible for terrorist attacks against Cuba, the blogger also adopts the point of view and U.S. says "the five were carrying out espionage activities" and they "provided information that led to the death of several persons" , an assertion that the public prosecutor's office in Miami has admitted to being unable demonstrate 44.
Yet the Court of Appeals in Atlanta agreed that it was not a case of espionage or an infringement of national security. Not less than ten Nobel petitioned Amicus Curiae to the U.S. Supreme Court demanding a fair trial and the release of five Cubans. Mary Robinson, former President of Ireland and UN High Commissioner for Human Rights UN between 1997 and 2002, the Mexican Senate unanimously, all political persuasions, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers , les Cuban-American Scholars , l’ Ibero-American Federation of Ombudsmen , le National Jury Project , le William C Velazques Institute and the Mexican American Political Association , le National Lawyers Guild et la National Conference of Black Lawyers , le Civil Right Clinic de l’ Howard University School of Law , l’ International Association of Democratic Lawyers , la Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers-Miami Chapter , le Center for International Policy et le Council on Hemispheric Affairs ont à turn demanded the release of five Cubans 45.
This court case has been repeatedly denounced. Amnesty International considers as the five Cuban political prisoners. For his part, Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson, former Chief of Staff of the Cabinet of former Secretary of State Colin Powell condemned the trial against them. "It's a shame: it condemns to prison for life for men who have come here to determine how and when their country was being attacked by persons who violate U.S. law." He said "This is a travesty of justice. These men had no weapons, no physical damage has planned against the United States and were motivated by the idea of protecting their fellow citizens from invasion and attacks by Cuban-Americans living in Florida " . Then he added: "We must also ask ourselves how did we get to be a sanctuary for terrorist suspects How is it possible that the United States of America can hold our own list of countries sponsoring terrorism 46 " .
Similarly, Sánchez minimizes the social gains of the Cuban system and says "they were already 47 " in Cuba for years before the Revolution. According to her, under the Batista dictatorship, " there was freedom of the press pluralistic and open, the radio of all political 48 " . It also defends the Cuban Adjustment Act - unique in the world - passed by U.S. Congress in 1966, which states that any Cuban who immigrated legally or illegally in the United States after 1 January 1959 st automatically obtains permanent resident status after one year, and various socio-economic aid 49. More unusual, she believes the Colombian writer Gabriel García Márquez does not deserve his Nobel Prize because of his friendship with Fidel Castro: "I think many Latin American writers deserved the Nobel Prize for literature than Gabriel García Márquez 50 ". Aware that the government's target is the United States to overthrow the Cuban government, she admits unashamedly share the same goal: "The United States wants a change of government in Cuba, and that's what I want also 51 " . Sanchez also reaffirms its determination to impose "capitalism sui generis 52 " Cuba.
Thus, in just one year of existence, while there are dozens of blogs earlier and no less interesting than Sanchez, Cuban blogger has won the Ortega y Gasset Journalism, to $ 15 000 April 4, 2008, awarded by the English daily El Pais . Usually, this award is given to writers and journalists with a long prestigious literary career. This is the first time someone's profile Sanchez gets 53. Similarly, the blogger has been selected among the 100 most influential people of the world by Time magazine (2008), with George W. Bush, Hu Jintao and the Dalai Lama 54. His blog has been included in the list of 25 best blogs in the world of chain CNN and Time magazine (2008) and has also obtained the English price Bitacoras.com and The Bob's (2008) 55 . On 30 November 2008, the English daily El Pais has included in its list of the 100 Hispanic America's most influential of the year (list in which Fidel Castro and did not appear nor Raul Castro) 56. Foreign Policy magazine was included in December 2008 among the 10 most important intellectual of the year 57. The Mexican magazine Gato Pardo has done the same for 2008 58. The prestigious U.S. university of Columbia He was awarded the Maria Moors Cabot 59. And the list of awards is long 60.
In addition, the site of Generación Y Sánchez receives 14 million visits per month and is the only one in the world to be available in no fewer than 18 languages (English, French, English, Italian, German, Portuguese , Russian, Slovenian, Polish, Chinese, Japanese, Lithuanian, Czech, Bulgarian, Dutch, Finnish, Hungarian, Korean and Greek). No other site in the world, including those of the most important international institutions such as UN, World Bank, IMF Internationally, the OECD, the European Union, does not have as many language versions. Neither the site of the Department of State, United States, nor even that the CIA does have such a variety 61. Another unique, U.S. President Barack Obama granted an interview with Sánchez 62.
never any dissent in Cuba - perhaps in the world - has won many international awards in such a short time, with a particular characteristic: they reported in Sánchez enough money to live quietly in Cuba until the end of his days. Indeed, the blogger has been rewarded to the tune of 250,000 euros in total, that is to say, a sum equivalent to more than 20 years of minimum wage in a country such as France, fifth world power. The minimum monthly wage in Cuba is 420 pesos, that is to say 18 dollars or 14 euros, Sánchez received the equivalent of 1488 years of minimum wage in Cuba for his opposition activities 63.
Sánchez has been in close relationship with the U.S. diplomacy in Cuba as indicated by a cable, classified "secret" because of its sensitive content, from the USIS. It is held in high esteem by the Obama administration as shown in the secret meeting which took place in the apartment of the young Cuban blogger with Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Bisa Williams during his visit to Cuba between 16 and September 22, 2010. When meeting with Williams, Sanchez expressed his wish to benefit from the services of the company U.S. money transfer Paypal - that Cubans can not use because of economic sanctions - to fight more effectively for a regime change Cuba: "Do you know anything could be done if we could use Paypal? . This service allows you to receive money transfers worldwide. The opponent has succeeded because the only site that benefits the Cuban services Paypal is Generación Y . While the dissenting regularly tells his daily on her blog, we can find no trace of his meeting with Williams, which shows its clandestine nature. This letter reveals the diplomatic ties between the Cuban media blogger and U.S. representatives in Havana and the importance given to the opponent Washington 64.
Another memorandum also discusses the importance of the interview granted by President Barack Obama Sánchez, who has contributed to the international media coverage of the Cuban opponent 65.
Lack of prospects for the Cuban opposition
Farrar is nevertheless realistic "No dissenting political vision has that could be applied in a future government. Although the dissidents will not admit it, they are only little known outside Cuba the diplomatic corps and foreign media [...]. It is unlikely that they play a significant role in a government which would succeed the Castros 66 ".
U.S. diplomacy note that the objective is to "support the good work of the dissident movement" in his campaign against the Cuban government by focusing on the task of theme "Human Rights" and "political prisoners" , the two reasons given by Washington to maintain economic sanctions against Cuba. This campaign is mainly for international public opinion because, according to Farrar, it "not interested Cubans whose main concerns are to have a higher standard of living and more opportunities to travel more freely 67 " .
In another cable, SINA also admits that it is isolated on the issue of human rights in Cuba: "The vast majority of the 100 foreign diplomatic missions in Havana does not face a dilemma of human rights in their relations with the Cubans. These countries do not address this issue. The rest, a group that includes most of Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan and the United States, says he uses different approaches to raise the issue of human rights in Cuba, but the truth and that most of these countries do not address the issue at all in Cuba 68 ".
The SINA also notes that some U.S. allies such as Canada do not share the same opinion on the issue of "political prisoners" , and evokes a discussion with their counterparts Canadian: "Our Canadian colleagues have asked the following question: someone who accepts money from the United States must be regarded as a political prisoner? . Canadian diplomacy and noted that all Western nations also sanctioned individuals who were funded by a foreign power to overthrow the established order 69.
U.S. diplomacy is not no illusions about the effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions against the island, which plunged the country into a delicate economic crisis. She says "the Cuban people are accustomed to hard times and respond to future government restrictions with similar endurance 70 " . It dismisses the possibility of a serious crisis and notes that "Cuba and Cubans are not as vulnerable as they were in 1989 before the end of Soviet aid. also "the standard of living of Cubans, although not as high as twenty years ago before the end of Soviet aid, is still much better than during the darkest days of period between 1990 and 1993 when GDP fell by over 35% ". In addition, "the Cuban economy today is less vulnerable [...] thanks to sources of income and credits and a more diverse population with more resources Cuban 71 " .
Nevertheless, despite economic sanctions imposed by Washington, the U.S. diplomacy said that the Cubans feel no particular animosity against U.S. citizens because they do not the people of Northern responsible for policy Washington. The highlights SINA and "positive feelings towards the American people 72 " .
Conclusion
Nearly half a century after its development, the U.S. policy of creating and supporting an internal opposition in Cuba is still in force. This strategy, underground for nearly thirty years, is now claimed and service, even if it is considered illegal in the eyes of international law. Thus, funding for the Cuban opposition by the United States reached several million dollars per year. Faced with the erosion of traditional division represented by Oswaldo Payá, Elizardo Sánchez, Vladimiro Roca, Marta Beatriz Roque, Fariñas and the Ladies in White, Washington is now focusing on the new generation of opponents whose figurehead is the blogger Cuban Sánchez.
diplomatic contacts to allow dissenting blogger from reaching the White House and regularly meets with senior U.S. officials such as Bisa Williams. To avoid criticism, the U.S. diversify their support for the Cuban opposition. In addition to using Financial provided directly, they have established with a powerful political network and media at their disposal a system of funding "legal" that is to reward the opposition to the Cuban government by handing over "price" with dozens of thousands of dollars, as illustrated by the avalanche of awards received by Sánchez, the new face of Washington, within a few months.
The goal of Washington is more to unite the Cuban people around these people who advocate a system change in Cuba, because he knows that their speech is hardly audible to the inhabitants of the island, which remain overwhelmingly committed to the revolutionary process, despite the difficulties and vicissitudes of daily living. The combined opposition in the U.S. rise in the best case of indifference on the part of Cubans and often rejection. War is more of a media. Maintaining the presence of an internal opposition, even without scale and cut any popular base, it can justify its policy of isolation and sanctions against the Havana government on behalf of the struggle for rights rights and democracy.
Notes
1 Lester D. Mallory, « Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) », 6 avril 1960, Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/4-660, Secret, Drafted by Mallory, in Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba : (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 885.
2 Marion W. Boggs, « Memorandum of Discussion at 432d meeting of the National Security Council, Washington », 14 janvier 1960, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records, Top Secret, in Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960 (Washington : United States Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 742-743.
3 Cuban Democracy Act , Titre XVII, Section 1705, 1992.
4 Helms-Burton Act, Titre I, Section 109, 1996.
5 Colin L. Powell, Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, (Washington: United States Department of State, May 2004). www.state.gov/documents/
6 Roger F. Noriega, " Assistant Secretary Noriega 's Statement Before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations ," Department of State, 3 March 2005. (Accessed 9 April 2005 ).
7 Condoleezza Rice & Carlos Gutierrez, Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, (Washington: United States Department of State, July 2006). www.cafc.gov/documents/
8 Ibid., P. 22.
9 Along the Malecon, "Exclusive: Q & A with USAID, October 25, 2010. http://alongthemalecon.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 The Associated Press / El Nuevo Herald, "Cuba: U.S. must take 'measures' against diplomats", 19 mai 2008.
13 El Nuevo Herald, "Cuban Dissident fears he may be imprisoned", 21 mai 2008.
14 Patrick Bele, "Cuba accuse Washington de payer les Dissidents', Le Figaro, 21 mai 2008.
15 Agence France-Presse, "state press interview makes it unusual street Cuban dissidents", 22 mai 2008.
16 Tracey Eaton, "Factions Spar Over U.S. Aid for Cuba", The Houston Chronicle, 18 décembre 2010.
17 Agence France-Presse , "Financement of Dissidence: Cuba 'somme' Washington s'expliquer "22 mai 2008.
18 EFE, "A Cuban deputy opponents proposed new penalties paid by the U.S.", 28 mai 2008.
19 Jeff Franks, "Top U.S. Diplomat Cash Ferries to Dissident: Cuba," Reuters, 19 mai 2008.
20 Ben Feller, "Bush Touts Cuban Life After Castro", Associated Press, 24 octobre 2007.
21 Will Weissert, "Activists dependens cubanos del financiamiento extranjero", The Associated Press, August 15, 2008.
22 Félix Rousseau, "Fariñas, thorn in the side of Raúl Castro," Liberation, March 17, 2010.
23 Amnesty International, "Cuba. Five years too many, the new government must release jailed dissidents », 18 mars 2008. http://www.amnesty.org/fr/for-
24 Radio Habana Cuba , « Former Chief of US Interests Section in Havana Wayne Smith Says Sending Money to Mercenaries in Cuba is Illegal », 21 mai 2008.
25 Wayne S. Smith, « New Cuba Commission Report : Formula for Continued Failure », Center for International Policy, July 10, 2006.
26 Jonathan D. Farrar, "The U.S. and the Role of the Opposition in Cuba," United States Interests Section, April 9, 2009, cable 09HAVANA221. http://213.251.145.96/cable/
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Joaquin F. Monserrate, « GOC Signals ‘Readiness to Move Forward’ », United States Interests Section, 25 septembre 2009, cable 09HAVANA592, http://213.251.145.96/cable/
31 Jonathan D. Farrar, « Key Trading Parters See No Big Economic Reforms », United States Interests Section, 9 février 2010, cable 10HAVANA84, http://213.251.145.96/cable/
32 Michael E. Parmly, "Comsec Discusses Freedom and Democracy With Cuban Youth," United States Interests Section, January 18, 2008, 08HAVANA66, http://213.251.145.96/cable/
33 Jonathan D. Farrar, "The Speculation is Fidel's Health," United States Interests Section, January 9 2009 Cable 09HAVANA35, http://213.251.145.96/cable/
34 Jonathan D. Farrar, "The U.S. and the Role of the Opposition in Cuba," United States Interests Section, April 9, 2009, op. cit.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Sánchez, Mi perfil "Generation Y.
38 France 24, "This country is a huge prison with walls ideological, October 22, 2009.
39 Sánchez, "Siete preguntas" Generación Y, November 18, 2009.
40 Sánchez, "Seres de la Sombra," Generación Y, 12 de noviembre de 2009.
41 Salim Lamrani, "Conversations with Cuban blogger Sánchez, April 15, 2010, Voltaire,
http://www.voltairenet.org/
Sánchez about economic sanctions (2)
42 Ibid. Sánchez about the missile crisis
43 Ibid. Yoan Sánchez about economic sanctions
44 Ibid. Sánchez about five
45 Supreme Court of the United States , "Brief of Amici Curiae of Jose Ramos-Horta, Wole Soyinka, Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Nadine Gordimer Rigoberta Menchú, José Saramago, Zhores Alferov, Dario For, Gunter Grass, and Máeread Corrigan Maguire in Support Of The petition for writ of certiorari, No. 08-987, http://www.freethefive.org /
46 Granma, "Ex ayudante Colin Powell arbitrariedades denuncia contra los Cinco, "September 24, 2007. http://www.granma.cubaweb.cu/
47 Salim Lamrani, "Conversations with Cuban blogger Sánchez, op.cit.
Sánchez about the social gains
48 Ibid. Sánchez about the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.
49 Ibid.Yoaní Sánchez about the Cuban Adjustment Act.
50 Ibid.Yoaní Sánchez about Gabriel Garcia Marquez.
51 Ibid.Yoaní Sánchez à propos de l'objectif commun avec les Etats-Unis.
52 Mauricio Vicent, "" The changes will come to Cuba, but not through the script of the Government '", El País, 7 mai 2008.
53 The Country 'calls COUNTRY Ortega y Gasset Prize in Journalism 2009 ", 12 janvier 2009.
54 Time, "The 2008 Time 100," 2008. http://www.time.com/time/
55 Yoana Sanchez, "Awards" Generation Y.
56 Miriam Leiva, "The 'Generation Y'cubana", El Pais, 30 November 2008.
57 Yoani Sanchez, "Awards", op. cit.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 El Pais' One of the critical voices of the Cuban regime, best blog of the year ", 28 novembre 2008.
61 Yoani Sánchez, Generation Y.
62 Yoani Sánchez, « Respuestas de Barack Obama a Yoani Sánchez », Generación Y, 20 novembre 2009.
63 Yoani Sánchez, « Premios », op. cit.
64 Joaquin F. Monserrate, « GOC Signals ‘Readiness to Move Forward’ », United States Interests Section, 25 septembre 2009, cable 09HAVANA592, http://213.251.145.96/cable/
65 Joaquin F. Monserrate, "US-Cuba exaggerated Chill, But Old Ways," United States Interests Section, January 10, 2010, cable 10HAVANA9, http://213.251.145.96/cable/
66 Jonathan D. Farrar, "The U.S. and the Role of the Opposition in Cuba," United States Interests Section, April 9, 2009, op. cit.
67 Ibid.
68 Joaquin F. Monserrate, "Feisty Little Missions Dent Cuba's Record of Bullying Others to Silence on Human Rights", United States Interests Section, November 9, 2009, cable 09HAVANA706, http://213.251.145.96/cable/
69 Ibid.
70 Jonathan D. Farrar, « Key Trading Parters See No Big Economic Reforms », United States Interests Section, 9 février 2010, op. cit.
71 Jonathan D. Farrar, « How Might Cuba Enter Another Special Period? », United States Interests Section, 4 juin 2009. http://213.251.145.96/cable/
72 Michael E. Parmly, "Comsec Discusses Freedom and Democracy With Cuban Youth," United States Interests Section, January 18, 2008, op. cit.
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